After the two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, military analysts were quick to proclaim a “nuclear revolution”. These new weapons- enhanced many-fold by hydrogen bombs- caused such horrendous destruction that it was inconceivable they could actually be used as instruments of warfare. Their sole purpose, aside from serving as indicators of prestige, is deterrence- the prevention of war. Nuclear technology was making was obsolete. Should not this development constitute a fifth revolution in the use of armed force in international politics? The contemporary concern with nuclear proliferation indicates that, in both popular and officials minds, nuclear weapons constitute a continuity of threats to international peace and security, not a break from the past. Whereas the leaders of both Cold War blocs and their allies insisted that their possession of nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence was fully rational and a contribution to international peace and security, they perceived the expansion of nuclear capabilities to other states as a serious threat. The leaders of new states or "rogue" states could not be assumed to possess the rationality and moderation of leaders in Moscow, Paris, London or Washington. For some unexplained reason, the prudence learned by the nuclear great powers cannot be trusted to be learned by others. This view has prevailed despite evidence that, for example, the crisis between India and Pakistan in 2002 might well have resulted in war had their governments not feared that military necessity would demand the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation is a serious problem, to be sure, but it must be differentiated. It makes a considerable difference whether additional aspirants to the nuclear club are well-established states such as India or Japan or non-state-based terrorist groups. Yet the conventional wisdom underlying the view of proliferation as a profound and continuing threat is that such weapons have not at all altered the calculus of war and that therefore the greater the number of states possessing these weapons, the greater the probability they will be used. There are serious problems with this view, but there are more important reasons why nuclear weapons have not produced a revolution in the use of force. The record clearly indicates that for most crises, wars and armed interventions since 1945 nuclear weapons have been irrelevant. The possession of nuclear weapons undoubtedly moderate behaviour in a few crises, such as Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, but, for the hundreds of other instances where force was used, they did not come into play in any meaningful sense. War has not become obsolete, states still possess armed forces primarily for "national security" and many states have launched those armed forces against then neighbours and more distant societies. Nuclear weapons may complicate defence decision-making, but by themselves they have not brought forth a revolution as defined earlier.
The author agrees with all the statements except:
After the two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, military analysts were quick to proclaim a “nuclear revolution”. These new weapons- enhanced many-fold by hydrogen bombs- caused such horrendous destruction that it was inconceivable they could actually be used as instruments of warfare. Their sole purpose, aside from serving as indicators of prestige, is deterrence- the prevention of war. Nuclear technology was making was obsolete. Should not this development constitute a fifth revolution in the use of armed force in international politics? The contemporary concern with nuclear proliferation indicates that, in both popular and officials minds, nuclear weapons constitute a continuity of threats to international peace and security, not a break from the past. Whereas the leaders of both Cold War blocs and their allies insisted that their possession of nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence was fully rational and a contribution to international peace and security, they perceived the expansion of nuclear capabilities to other states as a serious threat. The leaders of new states or "rogue" states could not be assumed to possess the rationality and moderation of leaders in Moscow, Paris, London or Washington. For some unexplained reason, the prudence learned by the nuclear great powers cannot be trusted to be learned by others. This view has prevailed despite evidence that, for example, the crisis between India and Pakistan in 2002 might well have resulted in war had their governments not feared that military necessity would demand the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation is a serious problem, to be sure, but it must be differentiated. It makes a considerable difference whether additional aspirants to the nuclear club are well-established states such as India or Japan or non-state-based terrorist groups. Yet the conventional wisdom underlying the view of proliferation as a profound and continuing threat is that such weapons have not at all altered the calculus of war and that therefore the greater the number of states possessing these weapons, the greater the probability they will be used. There are serious problems with this view, but there are more important reasons why nuclear weapons have not produced a revolution in the use of force. The record clearly indicates that for most crises, wars and armed interventions since 1945 nuclear weapons have been irrelevant. The possession of nuclear weapons undoubtedly moderate behaviour in a few crises, such as Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, but, for the hundreds of other instances where force was used, they did not come into play in any meaningful sense. War has not become obsolete, states still possess armed forces primarily for "national security" and many states have launched those armed forces against then neighbours and more distant societies. Nuclear weapons may complicate defence decision-making, but by themselves they have not brought forth a revolution as defined earlier.
The author agrees with all the statements except:
The correct option is D For most of the wars that involved the use of force nuclear weapons had no meaningful use.
Is correct as it can be rightly inferred from the passage that the use or possession of nuclear weapons is, in general, both harmful and threatening to the world peace. ‘forge’ means ‘to build’ here in the passage.
For most of the wars that involved the use of force nuclear weapons had no meaningful use.
Is correct as it can be rightly inferred from the passage that the use or possession of nuclear weapons is, in general, both harmful and threatening to the world peace. ‘forge’ means ‘to build’ here in the passage.
