27 Apr 2019: UPSC Exam Comprehensive News Analysis

A. GS1 Related

• ICDS Scheme providing for supplementary nutrition, immunization and pre-school education to the children is a popular flagship programme of the government.
• It is one of the world’s largest programs providing for an integrated package of services for the holistic development of the child. ICDS is a Centrally Sponsored Scheme implemented by state governments and union territories.
  • All components of ICDS except Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP) are financed through a 60:40 ratio (central: state).
  • The Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP) component was funded through a 50:50 ratio. The North East states have a 90:10 ratio.
• These services are provided from Anganwadi centers established mainly in rural areas and staffed with frontline workers.
• In addition to fighting malnutrition and ill health, the programme is also intended to combat gender inequality by providing girls the same resources as boys.
• Implemented by the Women and Child Development Ministry

Beneficiaries

• Children in the age group of 0-6 years
• Pregnant women and
• Lactating mothers

Objectives of the Scheme are:

• to improve the nutritional and health status of children in the age-group 0-6 years;
• to lay the foundation for proper psychological, physical and social development of the child;
• to reduce the incidence of mortality, morbidity, malnutrition and school dropout;
• to achieve effective co-ordination of policy and implementation amongst the various departments to promote child development; and
• to enhance the capability of the mother to look after the normal health and nutritional needs of the child through proper nutrition and health education.

The following services are sponsored under ICDS to help achieve its objectives:

• Supplementary nutrition
• Pre-school non formal education
• Nutrition and Health information
• Health checkup
• Immunization
• Referral services

The last three services are related to health and are provided by Ministry/Department of Health and Family Welfare through NRHM & Health system.

Context

• As per a study published in the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition shows that a diet with relatively more protein is needed during the second and third trimesters of pregnancy for the growth and development of the baby.
• Accordingly the Centre’s Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Scheme provides supplementary nutrition services for children.

B. GS2 Related

Context

• The Supreme Court directed the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to disclose information about its Annual Inspection Report of banks and the list of wilful defaulters under the Right to Information Act (RTI).
• Earlier, the apex court and the Central Information Commission (CIC), both had held that the RBI cannot deny information to an information seeker under the transparency law unless the material is exempted from disclosure under the law.

Annual Inspection Report of banks

• RBI is empowered under section 35 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 to conduct annual inspection of all commercial banks—public, private and foreign.
• It conducts an on-site inspection of all banks once a year.
• RBI officials visit the head offices and branches of banks to inspect the books
• Currently, the annual inspection is based on a Risk-Based Supervision method which focuses on “evaluating both present and future risks, identifying incipient problems and facilitates prompt intervention/early corrective action”.
• It covers financial position, functioning of board and various links of the bank, details of assets and liabilities, treasury management, asset liability management, liquidity operations, para banking activities, etc.
  • Earlier RBI used to follow the CAMELS approach—capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earning, liquidity and system and control.
• The content of the annual inspection report is discussed with the head of the particular bank before finalization. The final report is then shared with the banks to enable them to take corrective steps.

Details

• The Court, which did not initiate contempt proceedings against the RBI, warned that any future violation of the transparency law would be “viewed seriously”.
• SC bench also directed the federal bank to review its policy to disclose information relating to banks under RTI.

Background

• Few petitioners were denied copies of inspection reports of ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, HDFC Bank and State Bank of India from April 2011 till December 2015.
• They had sought the inspection reports under the RTI in December 2015.
• The RBI had stated that it was exempt from disclosing information under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act and Section 45NB of the Reserve Bank of India Act.
• The RBI, in its defence, had said that it cannot disclose information as the annual inspection report of the bank contained “fiduciary” information as defined under the transparency law.
  • To which SC had said in its judgment in 2016 that the RBI is not in any fiduciary relationship with any bank.

Central Information Commission (CIC)

• In 2011 the CIC said the public has the right to know how banks are functioning since significant amounts of public funds are kept in banks.
• Former CIC Shailesh Gandhi had directed the RBI to disclose the names of banks that had been penalized or served show-cause notices.
• However, the central bank defended its stance on the grounds of protecting fiduciary and commercial interests.

What is the impact of the Supreme Court order?

• The RBI will be required to provide annual inspection reports and other material (such as details of penalties) unless it is exempted under law.
• While this will provide greater transparency about the affairs of banks, it has the potential to affect the regulatory process of the RBI.
• Information contained in RBI annual inspection reports relating to banks is highly sensitive. The central bank through these efforts tries to ensure that the banking system remains smooth with minimum disruptions. Greater bank disclosures help investors and depositors, but it can also have unintended consequences.

• Section 17 in the Representation of the People Act, 1950
  • No person to be registered in more than one constituency.—No person shall be entitled to be registered in the electoral roll for more than one constituency
• Section 18 in the Representation of the People Act, 1950
  • No person to be registered more than once in any constituency.—No person shall be entitled to be registered in the electoral roll for any constituency more than once.
• “ Making false declarations.—If any person makes in connection with—
  • the preparation, revision or correction of an electoral roll, or
  • the inclusion or exclusion of any entry in or from an electoral roll,
  • a statement or declaration in writing which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.”
• In the case of Keshav Lal Thakur v. State of Bihar, (1996), the Supreme Court has clearly held that offence under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, is a non-cognizable offence.

Context

• AAP accuses Gautam Gambhir for having two voter IDs.

Context

• The Islamic State (IS) has lately taken responsibility.

Background

• Previously forty or more Sri Lankans travelled to Syria to fight with IS could help explain how the terror network was able to build vital personal links in the very small community of Sri Lankan Islamist extremists so it could subcontract its attack plans to them.

Resemblance with earlier attacks

• The Easter weekend attacks are similar to the al-Qaeda attacks of the 2000s than to recent attacks of IS.
• Like the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, the 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, the 2002 bombings in Bali, the 2003 truck bombs in Istanbul, the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, the 2005 tube and bus bombings in London, the Sri Lanka bombings involved multiple attackers acting in concert. With the exception of September 11, all of these also involved Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).

Why Sri Lanka?

• Sri Lanka has a 4 per cent Muslim minority; an undetermined number are from the Wahabi sect and others are Sufis. However, in that country’s majority and hard-boiled nationalism, everyone other than Sinhala Buddhists are suspected of being anti-national.
• A severe trust deficit exists based upon years of internal civil war and internecine violence between various faiths and groups. The IS worked on this and recruited their fighters on the basis of propaganda brainwashing the local recruits.
• It is just the kind of situation tailor made for two things;
  • first, a demonstration of international radical extremist capability;
  • second to send home a message that these terror networks exist across the world and mother organisations still control them
• Sri Lanka was a soft target. Having successfully defeated the Tamil Tigers rebel group a decade ago through military might, Sri Lanka has become complacent. It has not seen a pressing need to develop police and non-military intelligence capacity to counter terrorism.
• At the same time, it has struggled with good governance and political stability.
• It has faced a major constitutional crisis
• Therefore in the competitive world of international terror, the IS perceives a need to continue retaining its current primacy; any leeway given to other major groups such as al Qaeda will see many years of effort in the Middle East wasted.

Why Christians were targeted?

• Targeting the Sinhala majority would be counterproductive as the retaliation from radical Sinhala groups such as Bodu Bala Sena would be intense.
• Targeting the Tamil community would similarly be counterproductive since the LTTE’s networks may eventually be needed.
• The Christian community is 9.7 per cent of the population and historically no Christian-Muslim feud exists in the island. That is all the more reason that the chances of retaliation against Muslims would be low.
• The IS, with its caliphate-like aspirations, would have viewed the killings at Christchurch, New Zealand as just the event to avenge with an act against Christians anywhere on the globe. Easter was the most appropriate time as was the selection of churches and five-star hotels where western tourists (again largely Christian) would be present in large numbers.
  • The type of suicide bombings witnessed in Sri Lanka would have called for resource collection, planning, motivation of seven suicide bombers and very careful coordination without even an iota of a leak. Five weeks to plan is far too little time. Christchurch probably only became a justification.

Concerns for India

• The Sri Lanka attacks hold major implications for Indian security, in part because the main group behind the bombings, the National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ), is an ideological offspring of the rapidly growing, Saudi-funded Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath (TNTJ).
  • The TNTJ, wedded to fanatical Wahhabism, rails against idolaters. It helped establish the Sri Lanka Thowheed Jamath, from which the bomber outfit NTJ emerged as a splinter.
• Like the 2016 brutal Dhaka café attack, the Sri Lanka slaughter was carried out by educated Islamists from well-off families. And just as Bangladesh blamed Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for the attack, the NTJ has ties with ISI’s front organisation, Lashkar-e-Taiba, which, through its Sri Lanka operations, has sought links with the TNTJ in India.
• NTJ leader Zaharan Hashim was inspired by fugitive Indian preacher Zakir Naik’s sermons and received funds from Indian jihadists.

C. GS3 Related

D. GS4 Related

E. Editorials

Editorial Analysis:

• Some experts opine that talking to one’s adversary in the midst of a war, a limited war or even hostility is often viewed as undesirable in the public mind.

India’s Experience:

• However, the lesson from the long history of warfare and India’s own experience in dealing with past crises is that talking to one’s adversaries is a crucial requirement for de-escalation and for bringing the two sides back from the brink.
• Such talks are often done discreetly and soberly via the ‘back channel’, away from media attention and focussed on de-escalation, meeting the aims behind the war-talk and achieving an honourable exit from the tussle.

How did India and Pakistan fare recently?

• In this regard, it is important to ask, how did Indian and Pakistani decision-makers fare in the end-February 2019 military encounter that the two sides found themselves in the middle of after the Pulwama terror strike?
• Going by the information that is currently available in open sources, and conversations with analysts in India and Pakistan, one would say that there were hardly any pre-existing/dedicated channels of communication between the two countries; the ones that were in place were not put to use; and very little bilateral conversation actually took place to de-escalate the crisis. That should be of great concern to us.
• Therefore, the military stand-off that followed the Indian Air Force strikes on Balakot, in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, should encourage the two sides to urgently put in place dedicated bilateral conflict de-escalation mechanisms, in the absence of which the two nuclear-armed countries could potentially head towards an undesirable, inadvertent and unintended conflict with unpredictable outcomes.
• It must be kept in mind that there is nothing to guarantee that military crises can be finely calibrated and controlled by central decision-makers — they cannot be.
• For instance, what would have been the nature of the escalation had the ordnance fired by the Pakistan Air Force actually hit forward military installations such as a Division HQ of the Indian Army in Kashmir and involved casualties?

A Communication breakdown?

• The conversation at the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) level, the highest military contact that currently exists between India and Pakistan and which has often played a de-escalatory role, was not activated during the crisis.
• Unlike previous years, since Pakistan did not have a National Security Adviser (NSA) or an equivalent official, there were no NSA-level talks either.
• The two High Commissioners, unsurprisingly but disturbingly, were called back to their home countries for consultations.
• Some experts opine that if anything, it is during crisis periods that envoys should stay put in their respective High Commissions to find ways of defusing tensions and relaying messages and options back to their governments.
• Curiously, India and Pakistan chose to do the exact opposite.

Back-channel Contacts:

• More significantly, some experts opine that there were apparently no back-channel contacts between India and Pakistan during the February 2019 crisis.
• During the Kargil conflict, on the other hand, politically appointed interlocutors had conducted discreet discussions on de-escalatory measures between the two sides.
• It is important to note that given the lack of abundant options for crisis communication, the two sides had to innovate on a war footing.
• Media reports have suggested that the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chiefs had communicated with each other about what might happen had the Indian pilot not been released by Pakistan, among other things, something the Indian NSA also conveyed to Pakistan via the U.S. Parleys between the intelligence chiefs is an unlikely channel and contacts between them, while useful during crises, would not be able to achieve as much as between politically-empowered interlocutors.
• Experts opine that the fact that there were fears in Pakistan that India was preparing to launch missiles at its territory and that the Pakistani concerns about a possible Indian attack have not disappeared in Pakistan also goes to show the poor state of crisis communication between the nuclear rivals.
• It is not difficult to understand why India chose not to communicate with Pakistan in an effective and officially authorised manner. Doing so would have taken away the political utility of the ‘teaching Pakistan a lesson’ rhetoric: how can India be seen to be talking to Pakistan at any level (except perhaps to threaten) when it is avenging the deaths of its solders?
• Some experts opine that even such a calculation shouldn’t have prevented India, from making high-level de-escalatory contacts with Pakistan, for doing so is nothing but wise statecraft. Not doing so allows domestic political calculations to trump the diktats of statecraft.

The rise in third parties:

• It is important to note that when the hostile parties do not talk to de-escalate, others tend to step in.
• As a matter of fact, February and early March 2019, witnessed a slew of efforts by third parties to ensure that India and Pakistan de-escalate from the nuclear brink.
• The Americans, Chinese, Russians, Saudis, Emiratis were all involved one way or another in defusing the tensions between the two countries.
• During earlier crises, Washington was the only mediator, but this time around, thanks to the tensions between the U.S. and Pakistan and the rise of other prominent actors in the region, there were several interested parties in the fray, each with its own agenda.
• Not only does the involvement of several parties make the situation more chaotic, it could potentially lead to more miscommunication and mismanagement.
• Critics point out an important problem: On the one hand, there was very little crisis negotiation between the principal parties to the conflict — India and Pakistan. On the other, there were several third parties who jumped into the fray for mediation, and it seemed as if both the sides were happily outsourcing their crisis management to third parties with differing agendas and motives.
• It is important to note that outsourcing conflict management to third parties, especially in the absence of one’s own mechanisms, is a recipe for disaster.

Concluding Remarks: The need to reinstate backchannel talks

• One of the biggest takeaways from the February 2019 crisis is the need to reinstate/re-establish high-level backchannel contacts with interlocutors in Pakistan, whether Islamabad or Rawalpindi.
• This is a lesson from various India-Pakistan crises, be it the backchannel through the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 crisis, discreet negotiations between the two sides preceding the 2003 ceasefire agreement and the post-Mumbai escalation.
• This is also a lesson the two Cold War rivals (U.S. and the Soviet Union) had learnt, that they had to keep talking to each other through the worst years of their rivalry. As a matter of fact, it took the Cuban Missile Crisis to convince the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to negotiate arms control, discuss crisis management and put in place confidence-building measures, notwithstanding the state of their relationship.
• Remember, the Cold War also had domestic political implications especially for the U.S., but that didn’t prevent them from instituting conflict-management measures.

Category: POLITY AND GOVERNANCE

1. Backstop option

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